Avoiding a Manifest Injustice: Missouri Decides Not to Execute the Actually Innocent by Shaw, Ryan Edward
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 2 Spring 2004 Article 7 
Spring 2004 
Avoiding a Manifest Injustice: Missouri Decides Not to Execute 
the Actually Innocent 
Ryan Edward Shaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan Edward Shaw, Avoiding a Manifest Injustice: Missouri Decides Not to Execute the Actually Innocent, 
69 MO. L. REV. (2004) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Avoiding a Manifest Injustice: Missouri
Decides Not to Execute the
"Actually Innocent"
State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper'
Are you suggesting, even ifwe find Mr. Amrine is
actually innocent, he should be executed?
That's correct, your honor.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 29,2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held, in a 4-3 decision, that
Joseph Amrine ("Anrine") presented clear and convincing evidence that he was
actually innocent of a prison murder in 1985 for which he had been convicted
and sentenced to death The court, however, had to change the law in Missouri
to reach that decision and set Amrine free. Amrine had petitioned the court for
a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his imprisonment and impending execution
represented a manifest injustice because he was actually innocent of the crime
for which he had been charged." Until the Amrine decision, Missouri followed
the traditional approach to habeas relief in which a prisoner's claim of actual
innocence could be used to examine a constitutional violation at trial, but not to
examine the evidence of actual innocence itself.' Under the previous law,
Amrine could have been executed even with persuasive evidence of actual
innocence. In granting habeas relief to Amrine, the Missouri Supreme Court
changed that. In so doing Missouri became one of only a handful of states
granting a writ of habeas corpus on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.6
The United States Supreme Court laid the groundwork for a freestanding
claim of actual innocence at the state level in Herrera v. Collins,7 a case in which
the Court ruled, ironically, that it would not recognize such a freestanding claim
in federal courts.' This Note will examine Amrine's case in light of the decision
1. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. Adam Liptak, Prosecutors See Limit to Doubt in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2003, at Al. (This exchange took place between Judge Stith of the Missouri
Supreme Court and Missouri Assistant Attorney General Frank A. Jung at a hearing on
Arnine's case on February 4, 2003.).
3. See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 548-49.
4. Id. at 545.
5. Id. at 545-46.
6. Id. at 547 n.4.
7. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
8. Seeid. at 416-17.
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in Herrera and the subsequent cases; cases in which states made determinations
about state habeas relief in response to the ruling of the United States Supreme
Court.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 18, 1985, in one of the recreation rooms at the Jefferson City
Correctional Center, someone stabbed inmate Gary Barber ("Barber") to death.9
Amrine, a prisoner at the facility, was charged with the murder after another
inmate claimed he heard Amrine admit to the killing.'° Terry Russell ("Russell")
was the man initially identified as the perpetrator by the officer on duty in the
recreation room at the time but, upon questioning, Russell implicated Amrine. "
The State's case against Amrine consisted of the testimony of three inmate
witnesses: Russell, Randy Ferguson ("Ferguson") and Jerry Poe ("Poe").' 2
Russell testified at trial that Amrine admitted to the murder.'3 Ferguson testified
that Amrine and Barber walked beside one another for several minutes before
Amrine pulled a knife from his waistband and stabbed Barber. Poe did not
describe the murder but testified only that he observed Anrine stab Barber.'4 No
physical evidence linked Amrine to the murder and, in his defense, Amrine
introduced evidence showing that he was not the killer. 5
The officer on duty in the recreation room at the time of the stabbing
testified that he had initially identified Russell as the perpetrator. 6 It was
Russell the officer thought he saw with Barber before Barber pulled the knife
from his own back, collapsed, and died. 7 Six other inmates testified that
"Amine was playing poker in a different part of the room at the time of the
stabbing."'" Three of those inmates also identified Russell as the person with
Barber. 9 The jury, however, found Amrine guilty of Barber's murder and
sentenced him to death.20
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Amrine appealed directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed
his conviction.2 Amrine then filed for post-conviction relief.22 At the hearing,
Ferguson and Russell testified and recanted their trial testimonies, disavowing
their identifications of Amrine as the murderer.23 "Poe did not appear or testify
in any of the state post-conviction proceedings, leaving his trial testimony
[implicating Anirine] intact."'24 The circuit court denied Amrine's petition for
relief and, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.25 At
that time, the Supreme Court did not address the fact that Ferguson and Russell
had recanted their statements against Amrine.26
Amrine then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri.27 The district court denied Amrine's
petition despite his argument that the recantations proved Amrine was actually
innocent, noting both Amrine's failure to produce any "new evidence" and the
continued existence of the un-recanted testimony of Jerry Poe.2" The court did
not address the credibility of the recantations of Russell and Ferguson.29
Amrine obtained new counsel who succeeded in locating Poe, and Poe
recanted his trial testimony in an affidavit."0 He denied having seen Amrine stab
Barber and stated that his accusation at trial was false."a The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing in the district court to
assess whether Poe's affidavit warranted habeas relief for Amnrine.32 At the
hearing, Amrine presented the recantations of all three witnesses.33 The district
court ruled that only Poe's recantation was "new evidence" and that it was
unreliable.34 The district court did not even consider the other two recantations
21. State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).




25. Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
26. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 544.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 544-45.
29. Id. at 544.
30. Id. at 545.
31. Id.
32. Arnrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230(8th Cir. 1997). "[A] petitionermay
obtain federal habeas review of defaulted constitutional claims if new evidence
establishes that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict in light
of the new evidence." Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 545 n.2 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 331 (1995)).
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because it determined that those recantations were not new evidence." The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment.3 6  The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on Amrine's appeal.37
Amrine petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus.3" Amrine's claim rested on the contention that all the available evidence
established his innocence,3 9 and that his continued incarceration and eventual
execution would constitute "a manifest injustice entitling him to habeas relief
even though his trial and sentencing were otherwise constitutionally adequate."'
The issue was one of first impression in Missouri." The Missouri Supreme
Court held that a defendant, sentenced to death, may assert a freestanding claim
of actual innocence by a writ of habeas corpus independent of any constitutional
violation at trial,42 and that the court will grant habeas relief if the defendant can
make a clear and convincing demonstration of actual innocence. 3 The court
determined that the evidence Amrine presented at trial, along with the
recantations, was clear and convincing and undermined confidence in the
35. Id.
36. Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023,1033 (8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the district court's assessment of the recanter's testimony:
The district court ... ruled that evidence is new only if it was not
available at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of due diligence. The testimony of ... Russell and Ferguson was
thus not new evidence, and the court did not err by deciding to focus on the
testimony of Poe. The district court was to "make its own credibility
determinations" in order to ascertain whether the new evidence proffered by
Amrine was sufficiently reliable to warrant conducting a Schlup actual
innocence analysis. After considering the videotaped deposition, the district
court found that Poe was not a credible witness and that his recantation could
not be relied upon.... This is a credibility determination which is entitled to
great deference, and we see no reason to overturn it.
Id. at 1029 (citation omitted).
37. Amrine v. Luebbers, 534 U.S. 963 (2001).
38. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 545.
39. Id. "Because the recantations were made over the course of [several] years and
between rounds of federal court proceedings, no court has addressed, at once, all of the
evidence" Amrine claimed showed his actual innocence. Id. Thus, the Missouri
Supreme Court was the first forum in which all of the existing evidence of Amrine's
claim was considered. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 547.
43. Id. at 548.
[Vol. 69
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original verdict." Accordingly, the court granted habeas relief and set aside the
conviction and death sentence. 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Habeas Corpus Relief and "Gateway Claims"
The writ of habeas corpus has its origin in the English common law and was
a remedy by which a person could challenge the legality of his or her
imprisonment. 46 Traditionally, the writ has been an important safeguard of
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless government action in that it
allows a person to demand of his jailer a justification for his detention.47 The
United State Constitution recognized the right of a prisoner to seek habeas
corpus relief.48 The federal courts were also given the power to issue the writ in
the original grant of federal jurisdiction. 49 The Missouri Constitution recognizes
and makes available state habeas corpus relief.5 ° Additionally, Missouri statute
provides for habeas relief.5 "Missouri law provides that a writ of habeas corpus
may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the state or federal government." 2
In State ex rel. Simmons v. White,53 the Missouri Supreme Court noted that
habeas corpus relief is available in Missouri after a criminal conviction only in
very limited circumstances.54 These limitations are the result of the need for
finality in criminal proceedings and the respect afforded to trial court
judgments.55 For example, courts in Missouri have discretion to issue the writ
only when other remedies are inadequate or unavailable.56 Also, in order to
avoid unending challenges, a person cannot raise in a habeas corpus proceeding
44. Id. at 548-49.
45. Id. at 549.
46. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (1999).
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.").
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
50. MO. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
never be suspended.").
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 532.010 (2000); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 91.01.
52. State ex rel. Armine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)).
53. 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
54. Id. at 445.
55. See id. at 446.
56. Id. at 445-46.
2004]
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claims that could have been raised earlier on direct appeal or in a previous post-
conviction proceeding. 7 There are two exceptions to that rule. 8 The first
occurs when the petitioner uses habeas corpus to challengejurisdictional issues. 9
The second (the exception at issue in Amrine's case) occurs when there exist
"circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results" if habeas
corpus relief is not granted.6 °
In Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court did not explicitly define what
constitutes a "manifest injustice" for the purpose of habeas cases. 6' But in Clay
v. Dormire,62 the court adopted the standard enumerated by the United States
Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo63 and held that, in Missouri:
[T]he manifest injustice . . . standard requires the habeas corpus
petitioner "to show that 'a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,"' and
further, "[t]o establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in the light [of new evidence of innocence]."
Thus, in Clay, the Missouri Supreme Court tied the manifest injustice
exception to the petitioner's probable showing of actual innocence based on new
evidence. 6' Adopting the position of the federal courts under Schlup, once this
new evidence pointing to actual innocence was shown to the court's satisfaction,
the manifest injustice standard became a "gateway" for the court to reach the
merits of the petitioner's otherwise barred claim of constitutional error.66




61. Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
62. Id.
63. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
64. Clay, 37 S.W.3d at 217 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986)).
65. Id. The court found this tying together of actual innocence and the manifest
injustice standard especially appropriate in Missouri because of "the fact that defendants
are already afforded an initial habeas-like post-conviction relief proceeding under Rule
29.15 or Rule 24.035 in which constitutional claims (usually involving ineffective
assistance of trial counsel) like those that so often appear in habeas corpus petitions may
be presented." Id. at 218.
66. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315. "Without any new evidence of innocence, even the
existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in itself sufficient
to establish a miscarriage of justice . I..." d  at 316; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 404 (1993). It is important to note that under Clay we are not yet to the thrust
of Amrine's freestanding claim of actual innocence. While new evidence of actual
[Vol. 69
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B. The Herrera Decision
But what if a petitioner attempts to use the manifest injustice standard not
as a gateway for review of constitutional error at trial, but rather to assert that
new evidence showing actual innocence makes continued imprisonment and
(impending) execution itself unconstitutional? Such a "freestanding" claim of
actual innocence came before the United States Supreme Court in Herrera v.
Collins.67 In Herrera, the Court addressed the question of whether or not, in the
absence of a constitutional violation at trial, a defendant's claim of actual
innocence could serve as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief.68
The state trial court in Texas found Herrera guilty of murdering two police
officers and sentenced him to death.69 He appealed his conviction and sentence
but the trial court's verdict was affirmed."0 He also filed three unsuccessful
petitions for habeas corpus relief (two state and one federal) arguing evidentiary
issues.7 Herrera then filed a petition for a second federal writ of habeas corpus,
asserting new evidence demonstrating his actual innocence.72 He produced
several affidavits: one from a lawyer who claimed Herrera's brother Raul (since
deceased) had done the killing, one from Raul's son who claimed he had
witnessed his father do the killing, and one from a schoolmate of Herrera and
Raul who claimed Raul told him he had done the killing." Herrera claimed that
because he was innocent his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process.74 The district court granted a stay of
innocence is necessary to meet the manifest injustice standard, this only gives the
petitioner review of a claimed constitutional violation or violations at trial. Without such
a claim, there is nothing to review once the petitioner passes "through the gateway." See
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.
67. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
68. Id. at 398-99.
69. Id. at 394.
70. Id. at 395.
71. Id. at 395-96.
72. Id. at 396-97.
73. Id.
74. Id. Herrera argued:
[B]ecause there was no available post-conviction procedure for raising a claim
of actual innocence, federal courts were required to provide habeas review.
Herrera stressed that he had no existing avenue available to pursue these
claims because he had missed the deadline for a motion for new trial and
discovery of new evidence is not grounds for state habeas corpus relief.
Herrera argued that due process consequently demands that the federal courts
step in to guard a defendant's constitutional rights, especially in a capital case.
2004]
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execution for an evidentiary hearing." However, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit vacated the stay and held that without an accompanying
constitutional violation at trial, a claim of "actual innocence" was not grounds
on which it could grant habeas relief.76 Upon the grant of certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted a
stay of execution pending the Supreme Court's decision."
The United States Supreme Court denied habeas relief to Herrera on his
freestanding claim of actual innocence."8 The majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, generally affirmed the traditional view that a federal court
would not grant habeas relief on a state criminal conviction absent a showing of
a constitutional violation at trial.79 However, the Court did not rule definitively
on whether the Constitution required habeas relief if a petitioner made a "truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence."'8 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion assumed for the sake of argument that if a demonstration were
made it "would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim.""1  Six other Justices were not so hypothetical. Three concurring
Justices," along with three dissenters, 3 all stated that the execution of an
innocent person would clearly be a violation of the Constitution. 4
Without defining the necessary prerequisites to make such a "truly
persuasive demonstration," the Court simply stated that, in the interest of finality,
Kelli Hinson, Comment, Post-Conviction Determination of Innocence for Death Row
Inmates, 48 SMUL. REV. 231, 241-42 (1994).
75. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397.
76. Id. at 397-98.
77. Id. at 398.
78. Id. at416-17.
79. Id. at 416. For the traditional view, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317
(1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992):
Where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application,
evidence which could not reasonably have been presented to the state trier of
facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. Of course, such
evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention; the
existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state
prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.
"History shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new
evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive
clemency." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
80. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
81. Id.
82. Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Kennedy) and Justice White.
83. Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter).
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a threshold showing would have to be "extraordinarily high."" The Court held
that Herrera had failed to make such a showing and that his new evidence fell
"far short of that which would have to be made in order to trigger the sort of
constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist." '86
C. Post-Herrera State Decisions
Since the decision in Herrera, several states have addressed the same issue
and have held that a freestanding claim of actual innocence, while not currently
available at the federal level, is available for state habeas relief. In In re Clark,87
the California Supreme Court, while refusing to grant habeas relief to a capital
prisoner in that case, affirmed that it would recognize such claims based on
actual innocence.88 The court found it persuasive that in Herrera six of the nine
United States Supreme Court Justices had expressed the belief that executing an
innocent person violates the Constitution, even if the Rehnquist opinion did not
explicitly say as much.89 The Court found it unnecessary to constrain itself to the
federal limitation requiring a constitutional error at trial.9" Rather it stated, "A
refusal to consider a claim of factual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence would be [itself] constitutionally suspect in a capital case."'" The court
set a heavy burden on such claims, requiring the petitioner to present evidence
that would "'undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to
innocence or reduced culpability."' 92
85. Id. at 417.
86. Id. at 418-19. The Court found Herrera's affidavits insufficient, noting that
affidavit evidence in this context is disfavored. Id. The affidavits themselves were
obtained over an eight year period with no explanation as to why they were not presented
sooner. Id. There were credibility problems due to lack of opportunity to cross examine,
and, other than Raul's son's affidavit, they consisted of hearsay. Id. The Court reasoned
that the affidavits were being used for delay. Id. at 417-18.
87. 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
88. Id. at 760-61.
89. Id. at 760. While Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion only assumed a
violation for the sake of argument, the concurring opinions of Justice O'Connor (joined
by Justice Kennedy) and Justice White, along with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Blackmun (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) all expressed the view that the
execution of an innocent person would be a violation of the Constitution. See supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
90. Clark, 855 P.2d at 760.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 761 n.33 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1196 (Cal. 1990)):
The requirement that a petitioner demonstrate his or her innocence requires
more than a showing that the evidence might have raised a reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the petitioner. The petitioner must establish actual
innocence, a standard that cannot be met with evidence that a reasonablejury
2004]
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In State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third
District,93 the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals also counted a majority of
Justices in the Herrera decision as stating that executing an innocent person
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.9 4 The court found that a state writ of habeas corpus for a
capital prisoner's claim of actual innocence was an "appropriate vehicle" to
avoid such a constitutional violation.95 In line with Herrera, the Holmes court
set a very high burden of proof for a petitioner in Texas.96 The court held that
a petitioner must demonstrate that "based on proffered newly discovered
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, 'no rational
trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'97
The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals modified the high burden of Holmes
in Ex parte Elizondo.98 While Elizondo was not a capital case,99 it included a
lengthy discussion of Holmes. The court decided that a burden of proof for a
freestanding claim of actual innocence was too high if it was "conditioned upon
a finding that no rational juror could convict the applicant after introduction of
the newly discovered evidence."' '0 Under that standard, exculpatory evidence
can never outweigh inculpatory evidence, making relief impossible.'O
When we conduct a legal sufficiency-of-the-evidence review
... we do not weigh the evidence tending to establish guilt against the
evidence tending to establish innocence. Nor do we assess the
credibility of witnesses on each side. We view the evidence in a
manner favorable to the verdict of guilty. In practice, this means we
assume that the jury weighed lightly the exculpatory evidence and
disbelieved entirely the exculpatory witnesses. We make this
assumption no matter how powerful the exculpatory evidence may
seem to us or how credible the defense witnesses may appear. If the
inculpatory evidence standing alone is enough for rational people to
could have rejected.
93. 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
94. Id. at 397.
95. Id. at 398.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 399.
98. 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
99. The defendant had been convicted of aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 204.
The result of this case was that Texas joined Connecticut and Illinois in extending habeas
relief on freestanding actual innocence claims to non-capital cases. Id. at 205. The court
held that not just execution, but mere incarceration, of one who is actually innocent
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believe in the guilt of the defendant, we simply do not care how much
credible evidence is on the other side.1
0 2
However, the Elizondo court found that the lower "more probable than not"
standard which was necessary for a "gateway" claim under Schiup was too low
a burden for a freestanding claim of actual innocence. 0 3 A "gateway" claim
under Schlup rested on the petitioner's accusation that the verdict resulted from
a constitutional error at trial, requiring a lower burden of proof on the petitioner
since the basis of the verdict's constitutional validity is called into question.'0 4
A freestanding claim of actual innocence must carry a higher burden because the
verdict is the result of an error-free trial.'O'
The court determined that the proper standard for a freestanding claim of
actual innocence would allow the court to make a case-by-case determination of
the reliability of the new evidence.'0° The court could then directly weigh the
new exculpatory evidence against the inculpatory evidence which was the basis
for conviction. 7 Because the jury's conviction at trial is considered valid, the
job of the court is not to review its verdict, but to decide if the jury would have
reached a different verdict in light of the new evidence)°8 The court will then
grant relief if the petitioner can convince the court "by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence."'' 9 Thus the "clear and convincing" standard articulated by the court
in Elizondo reached a middle ground between the "no rational juror" standard
(which was too high) and the "more probable than not" standard (which was
too low).' 0
Connecticut and Illinois also recognize freestanding claims of actual
innocence as appropriate for habeas relief and extend them to non-capital cases
as well. In Summerville v. Warden, State Prison"' the Connecticut Supreme
Court decided the issue on non-constitutional grounds, basing its decision on the
idea that habeas corpus is an inquiry into the fairness of a criminal proceeding. 2
In the face of no procedural error, the court could still grant habeas review in
102. Id. at 205-06 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
103. Id. at 208-09.
104. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995).
105. Id.
106. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 207.
107. Id. The court cited Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera as the basis for this
standard. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 443-44 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
108. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 444 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209.
110. See id.
111. 641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994).
112. Id. at 1368.
2004]
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extraordinary cases. 3 Because the conviction of an innocent person represents
such an extraordinary case, the court determined its habeas corpus jurisprudence
was not meant to prevent hearing a freestanding claim of actual innocence." 4
Connecticut adopted the high standard of the California Supreme Court in Clark
and denied relief in Summerville.' However, it did so because that standard
was argued by the petitioner. 1 6 The court did not rule out adopting a different
standard (such as clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence) in
future cases. '7
In People v. Washington, "' the Illinois Supreme Court decided to recognize
the freestanding claim in a non-capital case on state constitutional grounds.'
The court read Herrera as stating that, at least for non-capital cases, a
freestanding claim of actual innocence was not available under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 20 The
court noted that it was not obligated to interpret the Due Process Clauses of the
Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution in the same way, even
though they are identical. 2 ' After stating its belief that no person should be
deprived of life or liberty in the face of compelling evidence of actual innocence,
the court held "as a matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that a claim of
newly discovered evidence showing a defendant to be actually innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as a matter of due process.'
22
The grant of habeas relief would depend on an evidentiary showing of actual
innocence which was "'of such conclusive character' as would 'probably change
the result on retrial.""'123
In contrast Ohio and Virginia have held that a freestanding claim of actual
innocence is an insufficient basis for habeas relief.'24 In these cases, the state
courts chose to abide by the federal rule and recognize a claim for habeas relief
based on actual innocence only as a "gateway" to analyze a constitutional error
at trial.
113. Id. The court argued from the standpoint of "cause and prejudice." Id. (citing
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1375.
116. Id. at 1376 n.22.
117. Id. at 1376.
118. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ili. 1996).
119. Id. at 1335.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1337.
123. Id. (quoting People v. Silagy, 507 N.E.2d 830, 834 (I11. 987)).
124. State v. Byrd, 762 N.E.2d 1043, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Reedy v. Wright,
No. CLOOOOO-23, 2002 WL 598434, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2002).
[Vol. 69
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A. The Freestanding Claim ofActual Innocence
In State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper,'25 the Missouri Supreme Court first had to
decide whether it would recognize, as a matter of first impression, a claim for
habeas corpus relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.'26 The court
began its discussion by noting the traditional limitations on habeas review,
including the time limitation on claims that could have been raised at an earlier
proceeding.'27 To get around this limitation, Amrine asserted the "manifest
injustice" exception recognized in Simmons.'28 The court agreed that the
manifest injustice exception was applicable, stating, "It is difficult to imagine a
more manifestly unjust and unconstitutional result than permitting the execution
of an innocent person."' 29
The use of the manifest injustice standard allowed the court to avoid an
explicit ruling on the larger constitutional question of actual innocence taken up
by several Justices in Herrera and by several state courts. After noting the
opinions in Herrera in which six Justices argued that the execution of one who
was legally and factually innocent would be a violation of the federal
Constitution, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Article I, section 10 of the Missouri constitution similarly
provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." The constitutional guarantee of due
process protects the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power. Even were there no federal constitutional
violation in the execution of an innocent person, this Court couldfind
as a matter of state law that, as the purpose of the criminal justice
system is to convict the guilty and free the innocent, it is completely
arbitrary to continue to incarcerate and eventually execute an
individual who is actually innocent. Because of our finding that such
an execution would constitute a manifest injustice in this case,
however, this Court, too, avoids finally resolving this issue today. 3'
The court noted that normally proof of a manifest injustice would serve as
a "gateway" to allow review of the petitioner's claims of constitutional error at
125. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
126. Id. at 545-46.
127. Id. at 546.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 547.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
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trial. 3 ' However, Amrine was not seeking "gateway" review of constitutional
error as was available under Clay.' Rather he admitted that he received a
constitutionally adequate trial, but still sought habeas relief from his
imprisonment and future execution.'33 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court had
to determine whether it would bypass Schiup and Clay to recognize a claim for
habeas corpus relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.3 4
The court found that the wording of Herrera left open the possibility of
recognizing such a claim when the United States Supreme Court, for argument's
sake, stated that a federal court might entertain the idea if no "state avenue"
existed.'35 The Missouri Supreme Court stated that regardless of whether a
federal court would review the conviction, a state court could review such a
conviction if permitted by state law.' 6 Missouri state law expressly gives the
Missouri Supreme Court the authority to review the evidence in death penalty
convictions.' The purpose of this review is to avoid wrongful convictions and
executions.' Because the execution of an innocent person would obviously
result in a manifest injustice, the court determined:
[I]t is incumbent upon the courts of this state to provide judicial
recourse to an individual who, after the time for appeals has passed, is
able to produce sufficient evidence of innocence to undermine the
habeas court's confidence in the underlying judgment that resulted in
defendant's conviction and sentence of death. 39
Therefore, the court concluded, in the words of Herrera, that Missouri had "a
state avenue" to process a freestanding claim of actual innocence and that the
writ of habeas corpus was the appropriate means to assert such a claim. 40
131. Id. at 546.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 547.
135. Id. The United States Supreme Court itself declined to extend habeas relief
out of concerns for federalism. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416-17 (1993).
136. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546-47.
137. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.035.3 (2000). The court noted that this statute gave it
the authority to look at not only the sufficiency of evidence in a capital case, but also to
examine the "strength of the evidence." Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547; see State v. Chaney,
967 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
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B. The Burden of Proof
In Herrera, the United States Supreme Court posited that the burden of
proof necessary to establish actual innocence on a freestanding claim in federal
court would be "extraordinarily high."'' Having recognized the existence of
such a claim under Missouri law, the Missouri Supreme Court took up the
question of the appropriate burden of proof for such a claim in Missouri.'42 The
court reasoned that the unique situation of the freestanding claim of actual
innocence required a burden of proof that struck a balance between the proof
necessary (1) to grant habeas relief due to a constitutional defect, and (2) to
overturn a conviction on direct appeal.'43
Like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Elizondo, the Missouri
Supreme Court determined that the appropriate standard should be "clear and
convincing" evidence of actual innocence.' While the United States Supreme
Court determined that the burden to demonstrate a showing of actual innocence
is "extraordinarily high," the Missouri Supreme Court attributed that result to
concerns of federalism on the part of the federal courts; such concerns did not
affect the Missouri Supreme Court.'45 Under the "clear and convincing"
standard, evidence of actual innocence is persuasive to the court if "it instantly
tilts the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in
opposition, and the fact finder's mind is left with an abiding conviction that the
evidence is true."'" The court required that Amrine's evidence meet this clear
and convincing burden of proof.'
C. Clear and Convincing Evidence ofActual Innocence
Examining the facts of the case, the court determined that Amrine met the
standard of clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence.' The court
examined Amrine's conviction in light of all the evidence currently available in
the case.' 49 Because the recantations of the three witnesses occurred over the
course of several years, and different witnesses' testimonies had been examined
in different court hearings, no single court had ever reviewed, at one time, all of
141. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
142. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547-48.
143. Id. at 548.
144. Id.; see Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en
banc).
145. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 548.
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Amrine's evidence of actual innocence.' Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court
was the first appellate court to examine all the existing evidence in the case.'
The court noted that there was already a significant amount of evidence
introduced at trial which pointed to Anrine's innocence.' The officer on duty
in the recreation room where the murder happened had initially identified Russell
as the killer, not Amrine.' Six inmates testified that Amrine was playing cards
with them at the time of the murder.'54 No physical evidence linked Amrine to
the case, and the court noted that Amrine was convicted solely on three inmates'
testimonies. ' While this evidence was sufficient for the conviction, it was not
overwhelming.5 6 Additionally, all three witnesses eventually recanted their
testimony, making this case one of the rare situations where no credible evidence
remained from the first trial.' With three judges dissenting, the majority
concluded that such a situation met the clear and convincing burden of proof. 8
150. Id. at 544-45.







158. Id. at 548-49. Judge Benton filed a dissent stating that a hearing should be
held in which a master would hear and evaluate the evidence. Id. at 550 (Benton, J.,
dissenting). Benton stated that because previous courts had examined all the recantations
and found that they were not credible (and it is the credibility of the witnesses which is
the issue) the court should not so readily overturn a conviction affirmed on appeal, a
post-conviction hearing affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, and several reviews at
the federal level. Id. at 551 (Benton, J., dissenting). Judge Price filed a dissent arguing
that the majority's "loss of confidence" in the verdict was not adequate to set it aside;
rather Amine must prove his innocence. Id. (Price, J., dissenting). That all three
witnesses recanted only shows that they are liars, and the court must determine when they
are lying before deciding to set aside the verdict. Id. at 552 (Price, J., dissenting). Judge
Price agreed with Judge Benton that a master should be appointed. Id. (Price, J.,
dissenting). Price went on to say, however, that the court could set aside Amrine's death
sentence because under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 565.035.3 the court
determines whether the death penalty is excessive based on "the strength of the
evidence." Id. (Price, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo.
1998) (en banc)). The "loss of confidence" that the majority has in the verdict is relevant
in this analysis because "[a]n assessment of the death penalty cannot withstand this
analysis when it is based solely upon the testimony of witnesses all of whom recant." Id.
(Price, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Price argued that the court should set only the death
penalty aside. Id. (Price, J., dissenting).
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The majority stated that its confidence in the conviction and subsequent death
sentence had been undermined and that it must be set aside."5 9
Amrine was not granted immediate release. 6° The court stated that because
the evidence was sufficient at trial to convict, there would be no double jeopardy
if the state elected to retry him."" The court gave the state thirty days to refile
charges before Amrine would be released. 62 Amrine was released from prison
on June 28, 2003, after the Cole County Prosecutor determined there was not
enough evidence for a new trial. 63
V. COMMENT
In State ex rel. Armine v. Roper, the Missouri Supreme Court broke new
legal ground by adopting a new standard of review regarding claims of actual
innocence for prisoners on Missouri's death row. Before Amrine, the best a
post-conviction habeas petitioner could have expected from a claim of actual
innocence was that the court would use the claim as a "gateway" to examine
whether there was a constitutional error at trial. ' A petitioner such as Amrine,
who conceded a fair trial, would not have had a cognizable claim under the
previous law. Amrine changed the law in Missouri. Now, a habeas petitioner
may assert actual innocence in a writ of habeas corpus as a freestanding claim,
and obtain relief if clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence is
shown. 6 s
InAmrine, the Missouri Supreme Court chose to follow the lead of a small
number of states in recognizing a freestanding claim, based on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Herrera v. Collins which, ironically, had actually
refused to grant the claim in a federal case. 66 But because the Herrera opinion
sent mixed signals, it made recognition of the claim possible in state courts. Six
Justices (three concurring and three dissenting) agreed that the execution of an
innocent person would violate the United States Constitution.'67 Two concurring




163. Bill Bell, Jr., Amrine Is Freedfrom JailAfter Years on Death Row, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 29, 2003, at B 1.
164. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d
214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
165. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547-48.
166. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
167. See id. at 419-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Kennedy); id.
at 429 (White, J., concurring); id. at 430-46 (Blacknun, J., dissenting) (partially joined
by Justices Stevens and Souter).
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Justices argued the contrary. 6 1 The majority opinion upheld the traditional
"gateway" test against the freestanding claim, but also made an arguendo case
for recognizing the claim if a state were about to execute an innocent person. 169
As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent, Herrera "leaves the States uncertain
of their constitutional obligations."'"7
This uncertainty can be seen in the different rationales and results states
have come to in their decisions to allow or not allow the freestanding claim.
Courts in Texas and California recognized the claim and ruled that executing an
innocent person violates the United States Constitution. 7' Illinois extended
habeas relief for freestanding actual innocence claims to non-capital cases
through the due process clause of its own state constitution, regardless of
whether protection could be extended through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.' Ohio and Virginia
refused to acknowledge a constitutional violation and refused to hear
freestanding claims.'73 The Missouri Supreme Court in Amrine avoided the
federal and state constitutional questions altogether and found it sufficient to
decide the case on the manifest injustice standard.'74 The court did not address
the availability of the freestanding claim in non-capital cases, but it is difficult
to see why it would not be available in Missouri. If it is manifestly unjust to
execute the innocent, one could make a strong argument that it is also manifestly
unjust to incarcerate the innocent.
One thing that is clear is that in his majority opinion in Herrera, Chief
Justice Rehnquist was hesitant to grant the freestanding claim primarily out of
a concern for the finality of state criminal convictions.' 75 The concern for
finality is a powerful policy consideration. Criminal proceedings need to come
to an end and should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely. An extremely
important element in the Herrera Court's emphasis on finality was a respect for
federalism. 76 It was the disruptive effect that the freestanding claim of actual
innocence (made in a federal court) would likely have on a state's criminal
justice system that was the most powerful influence persuading the Chief Justice
to abstain from recognizing the claim in Herrera.7
168. See id. at 427-29 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas).
169. Id. at 417.
170. Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. See In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); State ex rel. Holmes v.
Hon. Ct. of App. for Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
172. See People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
173. See State v. Byrd, 762 N.E.2d 1043, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Reedy v.
Wright, No. CLOOO0O-23, 2002 WL 598434, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2002).
174. State ex rel. Anrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
175. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416-17.
176. Id. at 416.
177. Id. at 417.
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States, however, do not share this same concern for federalism. Thus, the
states can more directly balance their interest in finality against the strong policy
interest in punishing only those who are guilty and setting free those who are
innocent. "After all," stated Chief Justice Rehnquist in Herrera, "the central
purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the
innocent."' 8 In Amrine, the Missouri Supreme Court decided that the state's
interest in avoiding the execution ef an innocent person was the controlling
interest and recognized the claim in order to further that interest.
179
Limiting habeas relief to "gateway" claims does not adequately serve the
state's interest in avoiding the execution of an innocent person. Amrine's case
is illustrative. He had persuasive evidence of actual innocence, but was caught
up in a procedural nightmare that prevented him from presenting all the evidence
at once. He could achieve no relief under the previous system because he had
a constitutionally adequate trial. That result does not make sense. Actual
innocence is actual innocence with or without a constitutionally adequate trial.
The jurisprudence of "gateway" claims is, in the words of Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Herrera, "perverse." 8 ' As Blacknun noted, the only rationale behind
refusing to grant habeas relief to a capital prisoner with persuasive evidence of
actual innocence would be "the principle that habeas relief should be denied
whenever possible." 8'
The policy of avoiding the execution of an innocent person also affected the
burden of proof the Missouri Supreme Court set for the freestanding claim. The
"extraordinarily high" burden espoused in Herrera, and followed by the
California court in Clark, would essentially make relief impossible. The
Missouri Supreme Court in Amrine followed the logic of the Texas court in
Elizondo, setting the burden at a "clear and convincing" demonstration of actual
innocence. The reasoning behind this standard is sound. It makes relief
possible, yet does not show a lack of respect for a constitutionally adequate trial.
This burden will still, however, be a difficult one for capital prisoners to
meet. Again, Amrine's case is illustrative. His conviction was based solely on
the testimony of three prison inmates, one of whom was the original suspect.
Even with all three witnesses recanting, an absence of any physical evidence
connecting him to the crime, and eyewitness testimony at the scene identifying
someone else as the killer, three judges on the Missouri Supreme Court were still
not persuaded to rule that Amrine had met his burden. Amrine will undoubtedly
lead to more petitions for habeas relief, but it will likely only be the rare capital
prisoner who will have evidence equally or more persuasive than Amrine's.
178. Id. at 398.
179. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547.
180. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 437-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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As Judge Wolff stated in his concurrence to the decision, "we [still] do not
know whether Amrine is actually innocent."'82 But we do know that he has
persuasive evidence of actual innocence. The evidence that sent him to jail was
the testimony of three people who, at one time or another, lied. Whether the
death penalty is just at all is certainly a question open for debate, but it is
certainly not just to send a man to his death at the hands of the state solely on the
testimony of three prison inmates, all of whom have recanted the statements they
made at trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Joseph Amrine's case clearly looms large in the debate over the death
penalty in Missouri, and in the nation. Any time a person who may be innocent
is subject to punishment at the hands of the government there is a risk of a major
breakdown in the criminal justice system. But the issue takes on a heightened
dimension when the death penalty is considered. The incarceration of the
innocent is concerning enough, but one can hardly envision a more disturbing
situation than the state's execution of an innocent person.
The decision in State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper is a positive step for
Missouri's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Allowing the court to grant habeas
corpus relief when a prisoner has made a clear and convincing showing of actual
innocence, apart from a constitutional error at trial, is just one more opportunity
to ensure (as much as possible) that the criminal justice system fulfills its
purpose of convicting only the guilty and freeing the innocent.
RYAN EDWARD SHAW
182. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 550 (Wolff, J., concurring).
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